Standard of Care in Legal Malpractice by Fletcher, Martin T.
Indiana Law Journal
Volume 43 | Issue 3 Article 12
Spring 1968
Standard of Care in Legal Malpractice
Martin T. Fletcher
Indiana University School of Law
Follow this and additional works at: http://www.repository.law.indiana.edu/ilj
Part of the Medical Jurisprudence Commons
This Note is brought to you for free and open access by the Law School
Journals at Digital Repository @ Maurer Law. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Indiana Law Journal by an authorized editor of Digital
Repository @ Maurer Law. For more information, please contact
wattn@indiana.edu.
Recommended Citation
Fletcher, Martin T. (1968) "Standard of Care in Legal Malpractice," Indiana Law Journal: Vol. 43 : Iss. 3 , Article 12.
Available at: http://www.repository.law.indiana.edu/ilj/vol43/iss3/12
NOTES
STANDARD OF CARE IN LEGAL MALPRACTICE
In recent years, legal malpractice has become a subject of increasing
concern to the legal profession. The ambit of potential liability which
awaits the negligent attorney has under gone a significant expansion.
That an attorney would be liable to his client for the direct consequences
of his own negligent legal practice has long been established.' In fact,
legal malpractice was one of the earliest forms of professional negligence
recognized by the courts.2 Until recently, however, the concept of privity
of contract limited the attorney's liability to the pecuniary losses suffered
by his client.' In 1962, as part of the continuing assault on the require-
ment of privity, the Supreme Court of California noted that an attorney
would be liable to third persons who suffered economic losses as a
proximate result of his negligent legal practice.4 While the precise
limits of the liabilities of an attorney to third parties are not yet dear, it
is apparent that liability for legal malpractice has assumed a new di-
mension.
In addition to this expansion of potential liability, the rapidly
changing character of legal practice has produced significant problems
even in the traditional areas of liability. The increasing complexity of the
law, the development of specialization, the diversity of services which
clients expect, and perhaps the sheer volume of laws, all serve to increase
the likelihood that errors will occur, and concomitantly to increase
demands by clients for a more protective measure of professional con-
duct.' Furthermore, the increasing availability of malpractice insurance
diminishes the reluctance of clients and their attorneys to institute
malpractice suits. However, the threat of being sued for malpractcie may
act as an unwholesome restraint on the creative energies of the practicing
1. See, e.g., Pitt v. Yalden, 4 Burr. 2060, 98 Eng. Rep. 74 (K.B. 1767) ; Russell v.
Palmer, 2 Wils. K.B. 325, 98 Eng. Rep. 837 (K.B. 1767) ; Adams v. Ward, -Winch 91,
124 Eng. Rep. 76 (C.P. 1625).
2. Id.; Lamphier v. Phipos, 8 Car. & P. 475, 173 Eng. Rep. 581 (N.P. 1838).
3. See National Say. Bank v. Ward, 100 U.S. 195 (1879) ; Buckley v. Gray, 110
Cal. 339, 42 P. 900 (1895) ; Kendall v. Rogers, 181 Md. 606, 31 A.2d 312 (1943).
4. Lucas v. Hamm, 56 Cal. 2d 583, 364 P.2d 685, 15 Cal. Rptr. 821 (1961), cert.
denied, 368 U.S. 987 (1962). See also Biakanja v. Irving, 49 Cal. 2d 647, 320 P.2d
16 (1958) (overruling Buckley v. Gray, 110 Cal. 339, 42 P. 900 (1895)).
5. Cantrall, A Country Lawyer Looks at 'Specialization', 48 A.B.A.J. 1117
(1962); Joiner, Specialization in Law? The Medical Profession Shows the Way, 39
A.B.A.J. 539 (1953); Meehan, Careless Lawyers and Careworn Third Parties, 28
BRKLYN. L. Rav. 99 (1961).
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attorney, not merely because of the damages he may be forced to pay, but
also because of the injury to his professional reputation that such suits
are likely to bring even if he is found not liable. Consequently, the area
of legal malpractice deserves constant re-evaluation.
The single most significant factor in malpractice generally, and in
legal malpractice particularly, is the concept of due care. The attorney
must apply to himself, as the minimum guage of his actions, the standard
of care used to define liability for malpractice; it is through this concept
that the social policies defining the incidence of legal liability are expressed
when he fails to meet the minimum standard of care. The purpose of this
Note is to analyze the various factors in the currently articulated standard
of care applicable in legal malpractice actions, and to assess the adequacy
of those factors in view of the current status of the legal profession.
THE MEDICAL-LEGAL MALPRACTICE ANALOGY
The expansion of legal malpractice has been predicated on a sup-
posed similarity between the legal and medical professions; basing their
reasoning on this supposed similarity, courts frequently and uncritically
conclude that the rules governing legal and medical malpractice are
idential. Emblematic of this view is the leading Indiana case on legal
malpractice, Citizens' Loan, Fund & Savings Ass"n v. Friedley:
[a] ttorneys are very properly held to the same rules of liability
for want of professional skill and diligence in practice, and for
erronious or negligent advice to those who employ them, as
are physicians and surgeons and other persons who hold them-
selves out to the world as possessing skill and qualifications in
their respective trades or professions.6
Since courts have adopted this method of analogy for determinnig
legal malpractice rules, the medical malpractice concept of due care can
serve as a comparative touchstone for development of this Note. How-
ever, since the courts have asserted the analogy without analyzing the
professions to determine the limits of utility of the analogy, special notice
must be taken of differences in treatment of malpractice in the two
professions.'
6. 123 Ind. 143, 145, 23 N.E. 1075, 1076 (1889). Accord, Theobald v. Byers, 193
Cal. App. 2d 147, 150, 13 Cal. Rptr. 864, 866 (1961) ; Slade v. Harris, 105 Conn. 436, 442,
135 A. 570, 572 (1927); Olson v. North, 276 Ill. App. 457, 475 (1934); Cook v.
Irlon, 409 S.W.2d 475, 477 (Tex. Civ. App. 1966).
7. In all cases reviewed, the court merely asserted the existence of the analogy
and proceeded to adopt the "analogous" rule from medical malpractice; no court provided
analysis of the professions or a discussion of the proper limits of the rationale of the
analogy. See, e.g., Wimsatt v. Haydon Oil Co., 414 S.W.2d 908 (Ky. App. 1967);
cases cited note 6 supra.
STANDARD OF CARE
THE PROFESSIONAL STANDARD OF CARE
The elements necessary to establish a prima fade case of medical or
legal malpractice are the same as those necessary to state a cause of action
for ordinary, non-professional negligence :' a duty of care owed by the
defendant to the plaintiff, a breach of that duty, and injury to the plaintiff
as a proximate result of the breach.9 In non-professional negligence
actions, the standard of care by which the defendant's duty is defined is
stated in terms of the conduct expected of a hypothetical reasonably
prudent man under circumstances similar to those which confronted the
defendant.Y When the negligence alleged lies in the breach of a duty of
professional care, however, the defendant's duty is defined by the pro-
fession to which he belongs in terms of the minimum quality of pro-
fessional conduct "customarily" provided by the members of that pro-
fession. Thus, in an action for professional malpractice, the test of fault
or breach of duty is not determined by reference to the traditional reason-
able man standard, but by the degree of departure from customary pro-
fessional conduct."1 The custom-departure standard of care recognizes
that, where specialized skills and knowledge are involved, jurors are not
competent to implement a standard of care by reference to their own
experience and knowledge as reasonable men. Moreover, the self-evalua-
tive nature of a test based on customary professional conduct protects the
profession from the potentially destructive propensities of any different
criteria for liability which did not reflect the peculiar needs of the pro-
fession to have the proper allocation of risks between the attorney and
his client.12 The reasonably prudent man test might sacrifice the pro-
8. Professional negligence is generally termed "malpractice," and the words are
used interchangeably in this Note. The connotations of "malpractice" in the public mind
make it peculiarly unfortunate as a descriptive adjective.
9. Ishmael v. Millington, 243 Cal. App. 2d 520, 50 Cal. Rptr. 592 (1966) ; Eckert
v. Schaal, 58 Cal. Rptr. 817 (Cal. App. 1967).
10. Blyth v. Birmingham Waterworks Co., 11 Ex. 781, 782, 156 Eng. Rep. 1047,
1049 (1856): "Negligence is the ommission to do something which a reasonable man,
guided upon those considerations which oridnarily regulate the conduct of human
affairs, would do, or doing something which a prudent and reasonable man would not do."
11. See, e.g., Cervantes v. Forbis, 73 N.M. 445, 389 P.2d 210 (1964) ; Leverman v.
Cartall, 393 S.W.2d 931 (Tex. Civ. App. 1965); W. Momus, MoRmas oN ToRTs § 4 at
59 (1953) ; W. PROSsER, LAw OF TORTS § 32 at 164-68 (3d ed. 1964).
12. W. Momus, supra note 11, at 60. See also Curran, Professional Negligence-
Some General Conments, in PROFEssIONAL. NEGLIGENCE 3-4 (Roady & Anderson ed. 1960).
The custom-departure approach is well stated in Carbone v. Warburton, 22 N.J. Super.
5, 6, 91 A.2d 518, 520 (1952): "When a physician is charged with negligence in the
diagnosis and treatment of a patient's condition, it must appear that he departed from
the degree of skill required of him. And, in order to demonstrate this ultimate fact
two elements of proof are essential. First those standards must be established which
are generally recognized and accepted by the -branch of the profession to which he
belongs as the customary and proper methods of diagnosis or treatment of the physical
or mental conditions concerned in the inquiry. Secondly, a departure from such standards
under circumstances justifying the conclusion of want of the requisite degree of care."
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fessional reputations of competent attorneys or physicians on the altar of
an advocacy which, instead of serving to identify professional irrespon-
sibility, merely favored disgruntled lay victims.
The standard of care generally articulated in medical malpractice
was well stated in a recent case, Peterson v. Carter :"3
[the law is] that a physician or surgeon called to prescribe and
professionally treat a patient is bound to bring to his aid and
relief such care and skill as is ordinarily possessed and used
by physicians and surgeons of the same system or school of
practice, in the vicinity or locality in which the physician resides,
having reference to the advanced state of medical or surgical
science at the time.
Thus a physician is negligent when his patient suffers because of some
departure by the physician from the customary practices of physicians in
the community.
A concise general statement of the standard of care applicable in
legal malpractice actions is that in Hodges v. Carter :"4
[o] rdinarily when an attorney engages in the practice of the
law and contracts to prosecute an action in behalf of his client,
he impliedly represents that (1) he possesses the requisite
degree of learning, skill and ability necessary to the practice
of his profession and which others simliarly situated ordinarily
possess; (2) he will exert his best judgment in the prosecution
of the litigation entrusted to him; and (3) he will exercise
reasonable and ordinary care and diligence in the use of his
skill and in the application of his knowledge to his client's
cause.
While the formulation of the general standard of care applicable in
medical malpractice has become relatively fixed,"5 in legal malpractice it
remains chameleonic. It has been said that an attorney is negligent if he
does not possess and use "such skill, prudence, and diligence as lawyers
of ordinary skill and capacity commonly possess and exercise.""0 Again, a
See also Correll v. Goodfellow, 255 Iowa 1237, 125 N.W.2d 745 (1964); Rule v.
Cheeseman, 181 Kan. 957, 317 P.2d 472 (1957); Artist v. Butterweek, 426 P.2d 559
(Colo. 1967).
13. 182 F. Supp. 393, 394 (W.D. Wis. 1960). Accord, Ayers v. Parry, 192 F.2d 181,
184 (3d Cir. 1951), cert. denied, 343 U.S. 980 (1952). See generally McCoid, The Care
Required of Medical Practitioners, 12 VAND. L. REv. 549 (1959).
14. 239 N.C. 517, 520, 80 S.E.2d 144, 145-46 (1954). Accord, Spangler v. Sellers,
5 F. 882, 887 (C.C.S.D. Ohio 1881); Citizens' Loan, Fund & Say. Ass'n v. Friedley,
123 Ind. 143, 145, 23 N.E. 1075, 1076 (1889).
15. McCoid, supra note 13, at 558-59; W. MoRRIs, supra note 11, at 59-60.
16. Theobald v. Byers, 193 Cal. App. 2d 147, 150, 13 Cal. Rptr. 864, 865 (1961)
(emphasis added).
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client "has a right to. .. a fair average degree of professional skill and
knowledge."'" One court held an attorney negligent when he failed to
use the skill and diligence ordinarily possessed by "well informed mem-
bers of the profession,"'" but another said that "the skill and diligence
required of an attorney is such as a man of ordinary prudence gives to his
own business."'" Apparently the courts are not certain of the qualities
of the jural referent in legal malpractice actions.
Viewing Peterson and Hodges as representative statements, the
medical-legal analogy is clearly operative at this basic level. Both stand-
ards are purportedly objective, since each depends on what other members
of the profession would have done under circumstances similar to those
which confronted the defendant. This accords with the objectivity of the
reasonably prudent man test in non-professional negilgence. In each case,
objectivity is achieved through the self-evaluative technique of deter-
mining customary professional conduct in similar circumstances, and
holding the defendant liable only for a deviation from that custom. Both
medical and legal standards of care also include a subjective element in
the requirement that the defendant exercise his own best judgment and
act to the best of his personal abilities.2" It is this subjective element of
looking at the personal abilities and knowledge of the defendant that is
not paralleled in non-professional negligence." It is equally apparent
from Peterson. and Hodges, however, that there are dissimilarities be-
tween the general standards applicable to the two professions. On its
face, the medical standard is more particularized, since the locality of
practice and "system or school" elements are not present in the legal
standard.
Juxtaposing general statements from legal and medical malpractice
cases of the applicable standards of care is of little analytic value, how-
ever, since the statements provide no indication of the factual situations
which may result in liability. Each standard is merely the statement of a
methodology to be utilized in determining whether or not particular
conduct sufficiently deviated from acceptable professional conduct to
warrant the imposition of legal liability. The viability of each standard,
its adequacy to balance interests of the profession and the client, depends
17. Cochrane v. Little, 71 Md. 323, 326, 18 A. 698, 701 (1889) (emphasis added).
18. Citizens' Loan, Fund & Say. Ass'n v. Friedley, 123 Ind. 143, 146, 23 N.E. 1075,
1076 (1889) (emphasis added) ; Roehl v. Ralph, 84 S.W.2d 405, 409 (Mo. App. 1935).
19. Williams v. Knox, 10 N.J. Super. 384, 385, 76 A.2d 712, 715 (1950) (emphasis
added).
20. See, e.g., lit re Watts, 190 U.S. 1 (1903); National Say. Bank v. Ward, 100
U.S. 195 (1879); Palmer v. Nissen, 256 F. Supp. 497 (S.D. Me. 1966); Hill v. Mynatt,
59 S.W. 163 (Tenn. Ct. Ch. App. 1900).
21. See, e.g., The Germanic, 196 U.S. 589 (1904); Vaughan v. Menlove, 3
Bing. N.C. 468, 132 Eng. Rep. 490 (1837).
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on application of the standard to specific fact situations. Effective par-
ticularization of the standard thus becomes of paramount significance.
Initially, it is essential to determine to whom the materials used to
particularize the standard of care are to be directed, since the character
and qualifications of the recipent bear significantly upon the nature of
the materials themselves. In medical malpractice, the principle is firmly
established that the determination of the ultimate fact of negligence is a
function of the jury, under proper insfructions from the court . 2 Thus it
is laymen who measure the defendant's conduct against the standard of
care, and the materials used to particularize the standard must be
directed toward them.
In legal malpractice, however, there is a conflict among jurisdictions
as to whether the determination of negligence is a function of the jurors
or of the judge. The leading case in California, Gambert v. Hart," held
that whether or not an attorney's conduct was "negligent" was a question
of law to be decided by the judge. Although the jury continued to perform
the function of determining the "facts," "[w] hen the facts are ascertain-
ed, the question of negligence or want of skill is a question of law for the
court." '24 Although one writer has termed Gambert v. Hart a "rare
anomoly,"' 5 no California case to the contrary has been found and, indeed,
recent California cases have reaffirmed the quetsion of law approach."4
Although distinctively a minority position, the question of law approach
occasionally has been adopted by other jurisdictions."'
In a majority of states, whether an attorney's conduct was negligent
is a question of fact for the jury, just as in medical malpractice. The
22. See, e.g., Estrada v. Orwitz, 75 Cal. App. 2d 54, 170 P.2d 43 (1946) (dentist) ;
Norton v. Hamilton, 92 Ga. App. 727, 89 S.E.2d 809 (1955) (physician); Barnes v.
Mitchell, 34 Mich, 7, 67 N.W.2d 208 (1954) (chiropractor). Of course, where reasonable
men could not disagree on the facts, the issues may be decided as matters of law. Robin-
son v. Ferguson, 107 Ind. App. 107, 22 N.W.2d 901 (1939).
23. 44 Cal. 542 (1872). Bit cf., Note, Use of Expert Testinony in Malpractice
Cases, 15 HAST. L. Rev. 584 (1964).
24. Gambert v. Hart, 44 Cal. 542, 552 (1872).
25. See generally Wade, The Attorney's Liability for Negligence, 12 VAND. L.
REv. 755 (1959).
26. See Lucas v. Hamm, 56 Cal. 2d 583, 364 P.2d 685, 15 Cal. Rptr. 821 (1961),
cert. denied, 368 U.S. 987 (1962) ; Armstrong v. Adams, 102 Cal. App. 677, 283 P. 871
(1929). But see Floro v. Lawton, 187 Cal. App. 2d 657, 10 Cal. Rptr. 98 (1960)
(using both the question of law and question of fact approaches, leaving California
law confused).
27. See, e.g., Casner v. Gray, 54 Colo. 551, 131 P. 404 (1913) ; Hillegass' Adm'r v.
Bender, 78 Ind. 225 (1881); Gimbel v. Waldman, 193 Misc. 758, 84 N.Y.S.2d 888
(Sup. Ct. 1948). Of course, it is often impossible to distinguish when a court is adopting
a question of law approach and when it is ruling that, as a matter of law, the evidence
on one side or the other is indisputable, so that there is no fact question. The ambiguity
of the law-fact distinction contributes much to the confuison in legal malpractice
betweeen the proper functions of judge and jury.
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majority view is well stated in Cochrane v. Little :28
[i]n actions of this character against attorneys, it is the duty
of the court to instruct the jury for what species and degree
of negligence or want of skill the defendant is properly an-
swerable and what duty is imposed upon him by law, and leave
them to determine, upon all the facts and circumstances of the
case, whether the defendant has performed his duty, and if not,
whether the negligence or want of skill was of a charater
or degree such as to render him liable, according to the de-
finitions furnished by the instructions of the court.
It is not difficult to discover the rationale behind the question of law
approach. The judge, it is argued, being an attorney and skilled in the
law, is better qualified than lay-jurors to determine whether the de-
fendant was negligent. Moreover, the expertise of the judge in legal
matters provides a logical basis for a unique treatment of legal mal-
practice, since the judge does not have special knowledge and skill in
other professions.2" An ancillary argument might be that the court,
without the aid of a jury, traditionally controls the conduct of attorneys
as officers of the court and, arguably, legal malpractice is sufficiently
related to these other controls to warrant similar treatment.30
There are, however, a number of negative factors inherent in the
question of law approach. First, if the judge performs the function of
determining the fact of negligence, he may, out of fraternal concern for
the bar, apply the standard of care too leniently, or he may, out of zeal to
improve the bar, apply the standard too harshly. In the former case, the
close professional association of bench and bar may lead the public to
view the result as judicial favoritism. 1 Finally, the fact that the judge
28. 71 Md. 323, 326, 18 A. 698, 701 (1889). Accord. Walker v. Goodman &
Mitchell, 21 Ala. 647 (1852) ; Slade v. Harris. 105 Conn. 436, 135 A. 570 (1927) ; Glenn
v. Haynes, 191 Va. 574, 66 S.E.2d 509 (1951).
29. See Floro v. Lawton, 187 Cal. App. 2d 657, 10 Cal. Rptr. 98 (1960) ; Gambert
v. Hart, 44 Cal. 542 (1872). The proposition is supported by some commentators:
Weiner, The Civil Jury Trial and Law-Fact Disthictiois, 54 CAmiF. L. REv. 1867, 1894(1966) ; Comment, Attorney Malpractice, 63 CoLum. L. REv. 1292, 1306 (1963).
30. Judicial control of attorneys as officers of the court includes many facets of
legal practice. See, e.g., Hicks v. Hicks, 58 Cal. Rptr. 63 (Cal. App. 1967) (setting
attorney's fee) ; Ratterman v. Stapleton, 371 S.W.2d 939 (Ky. App. 1963) (establihsing
rules and regulations for attorneys); It re Williams, 239 Minn. 530, 83 N.W.2d 115(1957) (negligent legal practice as grounds for disbarment of attorney) ; New Jersey
Bar Ass'n v. Northern N.J. Mortgage Ass'n, 55 N.J. Super. 230, 150 A.2d 496 (1964)
(admission to practice).
31. Even under the majority approach, the relation of bench to bar provides ample
opportunity for unwarranted intrusions by the judge into matters tradtiionally left to
the jury. See Weiner, supra note 30, at 1194-95. It is interesting to note that the recent
expansoin of liability was initiated -by the one state which has consistently given thejudge a larger role in legal malpractice cases: Lucas v. Hamnm, 56 Cal. 2d 583, 364
P.2d 685, 15 Cal. Rptr. 821 (1961), cert denied, 368 U.S. 987 (1962).
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may be qualified to determine the question of negligence does not
necessarily make it appropriate for him to do so. The private knowledge
of a judge is generally not regarded as an adequate substitute for proof
through evidence provided by the parties. 2 Since the standard of
care is based on custom, even the judge, perhaps unaware of the pre-
vailing custom among practitioners, may require the assistance of expert
testimony. If jurors are competent to judge the conduct of dentists,
physicians, surgeons, and architects, they should be equally competent to
judge the conduct of an attorney. Furthermore, allowing the jury to
determine the fact of negligence in legal malpractice actions has the
advantage of minimizing judicial interferences with a traditional jury
function. Since jury determination is consistent with the general body of
malpractice law, the possible favoritism of the judge for the defendant-
attorney is minimized.
The majority approach is not, however, free from disadvantages.
The knowledge and expertise of the judge does make him an inviting
substitute for a panel of lay-jurors. The danger in the majority approach
is that the jury may be permitted to make an uninformed determination
based upon their own, non-legal, experiences. It is essential to the proper
functioning of the majority approach that the jury be made aware,
through testimony of those who are experienced in legal practices, what
the customs and practices of the profession would require in the cir-
cumstances which confronted the defendant. Only when the standard of
care is stated in terms understandable to the average juror and referring
to the particular conduct of the defendant can the standard be utilized by
the jurors to make an intelligent assessment of the defendant's conduct.
Since liability for professional malpractice is based on the theory
that the average member of the profession would not have acted as the
defendant, the conduct of the average professional person-the pro-
fessional "custom"-is of crucial importance to the jurors. In medical
malpractice, the principle is well settled that, except for cases clearly
within the layman's experience,3 testimony by other physicians is essen-
tial to establish a prima fade case.3" If the plaintiff falls to bring forward
such evidence, the court will direct a judgment for the defendant-
physician because the jury cannot rationally apply the general statement
of the standard of care unless it is made aware of what the average
32. See, e.g., Gibson v. Von Glahn Hotel Co., 185 N.Y.S. 154 (Sup. Ct. 1920);
Darnell v. Baker, 179 Va. 86, 18 S.E.2d 271, syl. 3-5 (1942).
33. Stallcup v. Coscarat, 79 Ariz. 42, 282 P.2d 791 (1955) ; Lawless v. Calaway, 24
Cal. 2d 81, 147 P.2d 604 (1944) ; Graham v. St. Luke's Hosp., 46 Ill.App. 2d 147, 196
N.E.2d 355 (1964).
34. Ayers v. Parry, 192 F.2d 181 (3d Cir. 1951), cert. denied, 343 U.S. 980 (1952);
Boyce v. Brown, 51 Ariz. 416, 77 P.2d 3 (1949) ; Robinson v. Ferguson, 107 Ind. App.
107, 22 N.E.2d 901 (1939).
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physician would have done under a concrete set of circumstances and the
jury cannot be permitted to speculate about what is customary medical
treatment.35 Testimony as to professional custom is also required in
malpractice actions against dentists, architects, and other professionals.
In an action for legal malpractice, however, the plaintiff is not
required to present testimony by other attorneys on the customary
practices of the profession in order to establish a prima facie case."
Albeit the opinions of other attorneys have been held admissible,"8
they are rarely utilized. The vast majority of reported cases do not
mention testimony by other attorneys and, where such testimony does
appear, it has usually been offered by the defendant in formulating his
defense." Only two cases have been discovered which unequivocally
place the initial burden of going forward with expert testimony on the
plaintiff."0 The net effect of not requiring the plaintiff in a legal mal-
practice action to present expert testimony to establish a prima facie case
is to shift the burden of presenting such evidence to the defendant. This
recognizes that, realistically, a malpractice action involves a trial of both
the attorney's liability for a particular act and his professional reputation.
Since the desire to protect and vindicate his reputation lies heavily upon
the defendant, he may feel compelled to present expert testimony in his
defense even though the plaintiff has not established a prima facie case.
The availability and use of a directed verdict or non-suit might relieve
the defendant of legal liabilities but would not necessarily vindicate his
reputation in the eyes of the profession or of the public.
There appears to be no articulated rationale for the unique treatment
of expert testimony in legal malpractice nor for the concomitant shifting
of the burden of going foraward with expert testimony. In states using
the question of law approach, it may be logically consistent not to require
35. See, e.g., Reese v. Smith, 9 Cal. 2d 324, 70 P.2d 933 (1937).
36. Stallcup v. Coscarat, 79 Ariz. 42, 282 P.2d 791 (1955) (dentist); Paxton v.
County of Alameda, 119 Cal. App. 2d 393, 259 P.2d 934 (1953) (architect) ; Tremblay v.
Kimball, 107 Me. 53, 77 A. 405 (1910) (pharmacist).
37. Goodman v. Walker, 30 Ala. 482 (1857) (testimony that defendant had
consulted a "distinguished attorney" and the distinguished attorney's opinion of
defendant's actions was excluded); Gambert v. Hart, 44 Cal. 542 (1872); Gimbel v.
Waldman, 84 N.Y.S.2d 888 (Sup. Ct 1948); Livingston v. Cox, 8 Watts & S. 61
(Pa. 1844).
38. See, e.g., Rhine v. Haley, 238 Ark. 72, 378 S.W.2d 655 (1964); Automobile
Underwriters v. Smith, 131 Ind. App. 454, 166 N.E.2d 341 (1960) ; Cochrane v. Little,
71 Md. 323, 18 A. 698 (1889).
39. Olson v. North, 276 Ill. App. 457 (1934) is apparently the only case reported
in which testimony by other attorneys played a significant role in framing the applicable
standard; all twelve witnesses were presented by the defendant to show the professional
acceptability of his conduct. Plaintiff presented no experts. See also Palmer v. Nissen,
256 F. Supp. 497, 500 & n.8 (S.D. Me. 1966).
40. Dorf v. Relles, 355 F.2d 488 (7th Cir. 1966) (based on the Olson case);
Rhine v. Haley, 238 Ark. 72, 378 S.W.2d 655 (1964).
779
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plaintiffs to present such evidence, since the expertise of the judge removes
the necessity for it. Under the majority approach, the judge may some-
times act as an expert witness, informing the jury from his private
knowledge as to what is customary legal conduct. But in either case, this
procedure of proof making would be contrary to our traditional views of
the allocation of functions between judge and litigants. Allowing the
judge to act as the sole expert witness is subject to the same objection as
allowing him to determine the ultimate fact of negligence.4'
In spite of the assertion that the rules of evidence are the same for
legal as for medical malpractice, it is clear that the majority of courts
treat the problem of particularizing the legal standard of care in a
unique manner, and in recent years a few courts have responded to this
apparent anomoly. In Olson v. North, which is likely to become a major
case in the field, the court asserted that "the rules of evidence governing
the trial of cases for malpractice against a lawyer are the same as those
against a doctor or dentist."'42 But the court went beyond holding such
evidence merely admissible: a jury verdict for the plaintiff was over-
turned "because there was no expert testimony to show that he (the
defendant) did not exercise that degree of care and skill in the defense of
Olson as used by other skillful and reputable lawyers in such cases....""
Olson clearly requires expert testimony for the establishment of a prima
facie case of legal malpractice and places the original burden of presenting
that evidence on the plaintiff. A number of recent cases have reviewed
and adopted the principles of the Olson case."
Requiring the plaintiff to go forward with testimony by other
attorneys seems clearly correct. It is not merely a matter of form, but has
significant relations to the burden and risks of persuasion, and to judicial
control of the jury. It is not discernible how a jury of laymen, without the
aid of such testimony, could determine whether an attorney had exercised
the care of the average member of his profession. In view of the com-
plexity of law and of legal practice, the confusion would be great in
many cases, such as those involving the rule against perpetuities, if the
jury were permitted to rely solely upon its own knowledge and ex-
periences. Moreover, placing the original burden to present expert testi-
mony upon the plaintiff treats legal malpractice like other forms of
41. See text accompanying notes 32, 33 supra. Although there is a rubric that all
men are presumed to know the law, an argument that proper legal practice is a matter
within the layman's knowledge is obviously false. Laymen probably have no more idea
what constitutes proper legal practice than what is proper medical practice. See, e.g.,
Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
42. Olson v. North, 276 I. App. 457, 475-77 (1934).
43. Id. at 477.
44. Dorf v. Relies, 355 F.2d 488, 492 (7th Cir. 1966); Cook v. Irlon, 409 S.W.2d
475 (Tex. Civ. App. 1966).
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professional negligence and reduces the likelihood that disgruntled clients
will begin ill-founded suits. Finally, it accords with basic principles of the
Anglo-American judicial system that plaintiffs bear the burden of estab-
lishing their right to legal assistance and to compensation.
LOCALITY OF PRACTICE
In medical malpractice actions, it is an established principle that the
standard of care which the defendant must meet to avoid liability is that
of the average physician in the same or similar locality. A physician "is
only required to possess the skill and learning possessed by the average of
his school of the profession in good standing in his locality. . ..",
Locality of practice, as a limiting factor in the standard of care, serves to
indicate to the trier of fact that the character of a physician's experience
and knowledge, as well as customary professional conduct, varies signi-
ficantly from one community to another." It also operates to exclude
testimony by physicians who, because they practice in different com-
munities, are not aware of the whole environment in which the defendant-
physician acted.
In legal malpractice, the courts rarely mention the locality in which
the defendant-attorney practices as an element of the standard of care.
Even when mentioned by the court, locality of practice has not been
considered a paramount factor in determining the propriety of the
defendant-attorney's conduct.47 When testimony by other attorneys is
admissible or required, the defendant may naturally tend to draw heavily
upon the local bar for his expert testimony and thereby automatically
place a locality of practice limitation upon the standard of care.4
But when the duty to go forward with expert testimony falls upon the
plaintiff, and natural tendency to draw upon the local bar ceases to
operate; consequently, if locality is to be considered, it becomes necessary
to impose a requirement that testimony to be given with reference to the
locality in which the defendant practices. 9
The substantive question, however, is whether a locality of practice
45. Moeller v. Hauser, 237 Minn. 368, 54 N.W.2d 639 (1952) (emphasis added).
Accord, Ayers v. Parry, 192 F.2d 181, 184 (3d Cir. 1951) ; Adkins v. Ropp, 105 Ind. App.
331, 14 N.E.2d 727 (1938). See generally, McCoid, supra note 13.
46. See, McCoid, supra note 13 at 569-75. See also Baker v. United States, 343
F.2d 222 (8th Cir. Iowa 1965) ; Moeller v. Hauser, 237 Minn. 368, 54 N.W.2d 639 (1952).
47. See, e.g., Theobald v. Byers, 193 Cal. App. 2d 147, 13 Cal. Rptr. 864 (1961);
Hillegas' Adm'r. v. Bender, 78 Ind. 225, 227 (1881); Cochrane v. Little, 71 Md. 323,
18 A. 698 (1889); Hodges v. Carter, 239 N.C. 517, 80 S.E. 144 (1954). But cf. Rhine
v. Haley, 238 Ark. 72, 378 S.W.2d 655 (1964).
48. See, e.g., Rhine v. Haley, 238 Ark. 72, 74, 378 S.W.2d 655, 662 (1964);
Olson v. North, 276 Ill. App. 457, 478-84 (1934) (all tvelve defense witnesses came
from the local bar).
49. See Cook v. Irlon, 409 S.W.2d 475 (Tex. Civ. App. 1966).
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limitation should be a part of the standard of professional care for
attorneys. By omitting the locality of practice element, courts may over-
look differences in resources and opportunities for experience among
attorneys in widely varying communities. For example, the attorney in an
industrial, metropolitan area is generally considered more sophisticated
ian the attorney in a small, rural community,"0 problems which are
common to the legal profession in one locality may be largely unknown in
another, and specialization in law is almost exclusively a metropolitan
phenomenon. 1 However, a form of specialization occurs whenever
attorneys in one locale are, through experience, peculiarly knowledgable
about a particular type of legal problem." Because it does not contain a
locality of practice limitation, the present standard takes an overly
simplistice view of the profession and allows testimony by attorneys who
are unfamiliar with the practice of law in the defendant's community.
Moreover, it would seem that a locality of practice limitation on the
standard of care is even more appropriate in legal malpractice than in
medical malpractice. What constitutes customary legal practice varies,
not merely with the resources and opportunities available to the attorney
in his community, but also from one community to another. Thus what
constitutes proper legal practice in one community may not be proper in
another, even though the external resources and other features of the
communities are identical."
More significantly, an attorney's conduct is frequently influenced by
the characteristics of the community in which he practices. In a recent
Texas case, Cook v. Irlon," plaintiff's attorney in a personal injury
action filed suit against only one of three possible defendants. When the
client failed to recover, he sued his former attorney for malpractice,
alleging that the attorney was negligent in failing to join all three
possible defendants to the personal injury suit. The client was permitted to
50. Pitt v. Yalden, 4 Burr. 2060, 98 Eng. Rep. 74 (K.B. 1767) (the court noted that
the defendants were". . . country attornies and might not and probably did not know
that this point [of law] was settled here above."); Cantrall, supra note 5; Isaacs,
Liability of the Lawyer for Bad Adzice, 24 C~AIF. L. REv. 39, 40, n.7 (1935) ; Note,
Legal Effects of Attorney Specialization, 30 ALBANY L. REv. 281 (1966).
51. See generally Cantrall, supra note 5; Joiner, .supra note 5.
52. See discussion by court in Cook v. Irlon, 409 S.W.2d 475, 478-99 (Tex. Cir.
App. 1966).
53. For example, in determining marketability of a land title, an attorney relies
on local determination of what title defects are significant enough to impair the title.
An attorney who pronounced a title marketable according to local standards is not
negligent merely because in a similar community the title would have been unmarketable.
See Gleason v. Title Guarantee Co., 317 F.2d 56, 60 (5th Cir. 1963) ; Palmer v. Nissen,
256 F. Supp. 497, 501, n.10 (S.D. Me. 1966). Compare Fenaille v. Coudert, 44 N.J.L.
286, 290 (Sup. Ct. 1882) with Matter of Woods, 158 Tenn. 383, 390-91, 13 S.W.2d
800, 803 (1929) (local filing procedures).
54. 409 S.W.2d 475 (Tex. Civ. App. 1966).
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introduce the testimony of an attorney from a small, rural town, 200
miles from the site of the original trial, that all three possible defendants
should have been joined. On appeal from a judgment for the client-
plaintiff in the malpractice action, the Court of Civil Appeals reversed,
noting that the plaintiff's witness was not competent to testify, since the
social and economic features of the original trial site, El Paso, Texas, and
the possible makeup of the jury would enter significantly into the
defendant's election of whom to join. 5
It would seem that failure to retain local counsel might constitute
legal malpractice, where the attorney was aware of his own ignorance of
significant local factors which might affect his client's cause. Many
courts require attorneys to associate local counsel when they come to
practice before foreign tribunals, and at least part of the rationale for
such requirements is a court's awareness of the significance of knowledge
of local peculiarities, whether legal, social, economic, or racial, to the
proper handling of a client's problems." When an attorney's actions have
been influenced by knowledge of the peculiarities of a community, it is
patently unfair to articulate a standard of care which does not take
cognizance of such peculiarities, or to allow testimony by attorneys who
are unfamiliar with them. Because of the variation of customary legal
practice from community to community, locality of practice should be
applied more stringently in legal malpractice than in medical malpractice.
In medical malpractice, testimony is frequently taken from physicians
in "the same or similar localities." 7 However, the mere fact that two
communities are externally similar does not mean that what constitutes
proper legal practice is the same in each. Proper legal practice varies with
the prejudices, associations, and inter-relations of the people of the
community, the jurors, the judge, and all those connected with the
judicial process. Proper medical practice, on the other hand, generally
does not vary with these kinds of factors.
An analogous problem unique to legal malpractice arises when an
attorney licensed to practice in one state undertakes the performance of
legal services involving the laws of another state. If the attorney is sued
for malpractice, is the standard of care that of an average attorney in the
foreign state or of an average attorney in the state in which the defendant
55. Id. at 478.
56. See, Martin v. Davis, 187 Kan. 473, 357 P.2d 782 (1960) ; Note, The Practice
of Law by Out of State Attorneys, 20 VAND. L. Rav. 1276, 1286-88 (1967). The practice
of associating local counsel as a means of acquiring knowledge of local peculiarities
was specifically noted by the court as one reason for the reversal in Cook v. Irlon, 409
S.W.2d 475 (Tex. Civ. App. 1966), discussed supra note 55.
57. See cases cited suPra, notes 49, 50, 51.
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is licensed? An early New Jersey case, Fenaille v. Coudert, s held that a
New Jersey attorney who undertook to prepare a contract for filing in
another state was not negligent, as a matter of law, in failing to ascertain
and comply with the statutes of the foreign state: "[a]n attorney is not
to be presumed to know the law of a foreign jurisdiction." 9 Apparently
the client could not reasonably expect the same quality of legal service,
with respect to foreign law, from the New Jersey attorney as he could
from an attorney licensed to practice in the foreign state. Significantly,
the court in Fenaille did not mention that the defendant practiced in a
metropolitan border area between the two states involved and, from his
location and experience, might easily have ascertained the law of the
foreign state.
The New York courts have reached the opposite conclusion. In
Degen v. Steinbeck, after rejecting the New Jersey approach, the Court
of Appeals held :6
[w]hen a lawyer undertakes to prepare papers to be filed in a
state foreign to his place of practice, it is his duty, if he has
not knowledge of the statutes, to inform himself, for like any
artisan, by undertaking the work, he represents that he is
capable of performing it in a skillful manner.
A recent federal case, involving Indiana law, reviewed the two approacses
and adopted the New York rule as the better.6 In Weldman v. Wach-
tell,6" on facts virtually identical to those in Degen, a New York supreme
court held that an attorney, who used reasonable care in selecting an
associate counsel from a foreign state, would not be liable for a negligent
error of the foreign attorney, in interpreting the law of the foreign state,
which he adopted. Apparently, his duty to ascertain the foreign law was
discharged by obtaining competent counsel in the foreign state. The court
also noted that the client would have a cause of action against the
associate attorney.63 With this refinement, New York's approach seems
preferable, since it protects the client from his attorney's ignorance of
foreign law, provides a relatively easy means for the attorney to dis-
charge his duty to ascertain foreign law, and allows the client to procede
58. 44 N.J.L. 286 (Sup. Ct. 1882).
59. Id. at 289. The case is more extensively discussed in Comment, Attorney
Malpractice, supra note 30, at 1298-99. The treatment of medical malpractice where the
conduct was in another state is similar. Daily v. Somberg, 28 N.J. 372, 146 A.2d 676
(1958).
60. 220 App. Div. 477, 479-80, 195 N.Y.S. 810, 814 (1933). See also In re Roel,
3 N.Y.2d 224, 165 N.Y.S.2d 31 (1957).
61. Rekeweg v. Federal Mut. Ins. Co., 27 F.R.D. 431 (N.D. Ind. 1961).
62. 149 Misc. 623, 267 N.Y.S. 840 (Sup. Ct. 1933).
63. Id. at 624, 267 N.Y.S. at 841.
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against the associate counsel when a negligent error relating to the laws
of that state is made by the associate counsel.
SPECIALIZATION: NATURE OF THE DEFENDANT'S PRACTICE
It is an established principle of tort law6" and of medical mal-
practice," that if a professional person holds himself out as possessing
greater skills and greater knowledge than the average member of his
profession, he will be held to a higher standard of care than a general
practitioner. Thus a medical specialist must possess and exercise the skill
and care customarily exercised by physicians in the same specialty.6"
This principle recognizes and protects the higher expectations of the
patient who has sought the services of one with purportedly superior
capabilities. At the same time, it protects both the specialist and the
general practitioner by ensuring that each will be judged by standards
appropriate to his professional level. 7 The development of widely re-
cognized specialties, requiring post-graduate training and subject to
certification by professional or governmental boards, have made it appro-
priate and possible for the courts to rely on standards of customary care
established for specialists as distinct groups.
In spite of the frequently asserted similarity between medical and
legal malpractice, the courts have been unwilling to recognize the legal
specialist. The experience and expertise of the defendant-attorney in the
subject committed to him by the client are not considered in articulating
the applicable standard of care. In Olson v. North, for example, although
the defendant held himself out as "especially qualified in the defense of
criminal cases, including murder cases," his liability for malpractice in the
conduct of a murder trial was based upon the abilities of the "average
attorney," with no reference to his experience and expertise, in the
articulation of the standard."8
64. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 299A, comment d (1957); W. PROssER,
LAW OF TORTS § 32, at 165-66 (3d ed. 1964).
65. See, e.g., Ayres v. Parry, 192 F.2d 181 (3d Cir. 1951), cert. denied, 343 U.S. 980
(1952); Harris v. Campbell, 2 Ariz., App. 351, 409 P.2d 67 (1965); Worster v.
Caylor, 231 Ind. 625, 110 N.E.2d 337 (1953). See generally Rosenbaum, The Degree of
Skill and Care Legally Required of a Medical or Surgical Specialist, 49 MEDico-
LEGAL J. 85 (1932).
66. See, cases cited supra note 66; Sinz v. Owens, 33 Cal. 2d 749, 205 P.2d 3
(1949) ; Worster v. Caylor, 231 Ind. 625, 110 N.E.2d 337 (1953) ; Josselyn v. Dearborn,
62 A.2d 174 (Me. 1948) (osteopath); Facer v. Lewis, 326 Mich. 702, 40 N.E.2d 457
(1950) (X-ray technician).
67. See generally McCoid, supra note 13; Rosenbaum, supra note 66.
68. Olson v. North, 276 Ill. App. 457, 475 (1934). See also Montrose v. Baggott,
161 App. Div. 494, 146 N.Y.S. 649 (1914), resettled, 176 App. Div. 883, 161 N.Y.S. 1135
(1916), rev'd on rehearing, 176 App. Div. 931, 162 N.Y.S. 1132 (1917), appeal dismissed,
220 N.Y. 686, 116 N.E. 1062 (1917). But cf. Peterson & Wallace v. Frazer, 79 S.W. 1077,
1080 (Tex. Civ. App. 1904) (standard of care one of "ordinary skills of attorneys
versed in the particular field.").
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Although occasionally there are dicta that the expertise of the
defendant in a particular area of law should be considered, the early case
of Childs v. Comstock 9 is the only case found in which a court recognized
the specialized character of an attorney's practice as a significant factor
in determining the applicable standard of care. In Childs, the defendant-
attorneys were retained to protest the imposition of a duty upon the
client's imports. When the duty was upheld by the Board of General
Appraisers, the defendants failed to make a timely appeal, although such
an appeal would clearly have reversed the Board's decision. The defen-
dants then sought to excuse their failure to appeal on the ground that the
Board followed a unique policy in giving notice of its decisions. Rejecting
this claim, the court held the defendants liable because :"
[t]he defendants were experts in that line of business, and
aside from these protests they represented a very large percent-
age of all protests filed against the imposition of tariff duties
that were heard before the board of general appraisers. They
were familiar with the practice of the government officials
and aware of the risk in relying on the irregular practice in
the transmission of notices of their decisions by the board of
general appraisers.
Although one writer asserts that a legal specialist "will be held to the
legal skill and knowledge common among such specialists,"'" no case law
is cited in support of the assertion, and it is believed that Childs is the
only case on point.
A number of reasons might be advanced for disregarding legal
specialization. Generally, attorneys do not become specialized by the
same process as physicians; few attorneys undertake formal advanced
study in particular fields of the law." Legal specialization is primarily
the result of a de facto process of limiting and concentrating a practice of
law to particular, narrow areas. But the fact that legal specialization
occurs in this manner does not make it any less real. The attorney who
has for a number of years maintained a practice heavily concentrated in,
for example, labor law, tax law, or municipal bonds can reasonably be
expected to provide a higher quality of service within this area than a
general practitioner or a specialist in some other area.
69. 69 App. Div. 160, 74 N.Y.S. 643 (1902).
70. Id. at 165, 74 N.Y.S. at 649.
71. Wade, supra note 26, at 764.
72. See generally Heckerling, Legal Education for Certified Specialiuzatio, 13
CLEV.-MAR. L. Rxv. 569 (1964).
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It is true that attorneys are not licensed by the state78 nor by other
associations74 to practice as legal specialists. The Canons of Professional
Ethics do not permit public announcement of an attorney's expertise in a
particular area." Although licensing by some official body would be
helpful in establishing standards for legal specialists, it obviously has
nothing to do with the fact that specialization exists." Without doubt,
the public, especially businesses, now expect and find specialized legal
services in "departments" of larger law firms. Even small firms and sole
practitioners often specialize. Obviously legal specialization is a fact which
the rules of legal malpractice must eventually reflect.
Two approaches might be taken to the formulation and application
of higher standards of care for the legal specialist. The first may be
called the "holding out" approach. In medical malpractice, it is well
established that if a physician holds himself out as a specialist, he will be
held to standards appropriate to a 'specialist, even though in fact he is not
a specialist.7  By analogy, an attorney who holds himself out as a legal
specialist, should be held to a standard of care appropriate to a legal
specialist.7 The "holding out" approach avoids the difficulties arising
from the uncertified character of the defendant-specialist, since the
"holding out" exists independently of a formal recognition of legal
specialization. However, the idea of a "holding out" connotes scienter, or
something very like a wilful misrepresentation by the attorney to his
client. The strictures of the Canons of Professional Ethics against public
announcements of expertise in a particular field of the law, as well as the
difficulty of proving a representation by the attorney and reliance by his
client, would substantially impair the utility of the "holding out" approach
in reaching the majority of legal specialists.
A second theory for a higher standard of care for the legal specialist
could be developed from the subjective element in the currently articulated
standard of care. Since the attorney, as a fiduciary and agent of his client,
73. See generally 5 Air. JuR. Attorneys at Law §§ 19-28 (1936); 41 Am. JUa-
Phyiscians and Surgeons §§ 32-37 (1942).
74. Although the ABA has had a number of committees on legal specialization,
such recognition is currently given only to patent attorneys and proctors in admiralty.
See ABA CANONS OF PnoFEssoNA. EThics, No. 46 does not permit a "public" announce-
ment of specialization, but does permit an attorney to make known his "availability to
act as an associate of other lawyers in a particular branch of the law."
76. Indeed, recognition of legal specialists for malpractice purposes might foster
the creation of evaluative organizations. Until formal recognition occurs, standards for
legal specialists may be established by testimony of attorneys shown to be engaged in
similarly specialized practices.
77. Epstein v. Hirschon, 33 N.Y.S.2d 83 (Sup. Ct. 1942) ; McCoid, supra note 13.
78. One who holds himself out as an attorney is held to the standard of care
applicable to attorneys, although in fact he is not an attorney. Biakanja v. Irving, 49
Cal. 2d 647, 320 P.2d 16 (1958) ; Foulks v. Falls, 91 Ind. 315 (1883).
INDIANA LAW JOURNAL
is required to "exercise his own best judgment,"7 and "act to the best of
his own knowledge,"8 it is arguable that an attorney who has knowledge
and skills superior to a general practitioner would not discharge his duty
to his client unless he exercised that higher skill and knowledge.8
Under this approach, the client would only need to show that his attorney
in fact possessed superior skills and knowledge, which he failed to
exercise. It would not be necessary to show a "holding out" by the
attorney nor reliance by the client on a representation. Unfortunately,
because this approach is initially tied to a subjective element, it would not
allow an unambiguous recognition of the fact of legal specialization.
Problems of proof and the difficulty of clearly articulating the theory to
the jurors would impede its use. It seems preferable to recognize frankly
that legal specialization is a fact of contemporary legal practice, and that
the whole standard of care, objective and subjective, must be higher when
the defendant is a legal specialist. A plaintiff should be permitted to
show that from the nature of the defendant's practice and experience,
greater skill and care was reasonably expected. Testimony on customary
legal practices should then be given with reference to the conduct of
attorneys who engage in similarly specialized practices. Finally, the
judge should instruct the jury that the experience and expertise of the
defendant are to be considered in determining whether or not the
defendant has breached his duty.
It is noteworthy that Degen v. Steinbeck82 and Fenaille v. Cou-
dert,88 discussed above with reference to locality of practice, lend col-
lateral support to recognition of legal specialization. Although the result
in each case was different, the underlying principles were identical: an
attorney is more qualified to practice in some areas of the law than in
others. In a sense, an attorney is a specialist in the law of the state in which
he is licensed to practice. Thus New Jersey chose to apply a lower standard
of care when the attorney stepped outside his state-law speciality.84 New
York, on the other hand, chose to demand a greater effort by the attorney
who undertook problems beyond his state law specialty, primarily because
it found an implied representation of competence in the fact that the
attorney undertook the task.8"
79. Carter v. Hodges, 239 N.C. 517, 520, 80 S.E.2d 144, 145 (1954) ; Spangler v.
Sellers, 5 F. 882, 887 (C.C.S.D. Ohio 1881).
80. In re Watts, 190 U.S. 1 (1902) ; Pete v. Henderson, 124 Cal. App. 2d 487, 269
P.2d 78 (1954). See also Glenn v. Haynes, 192 Va. 574, 66 S.E.2d 509 (1951).
81. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 379, comment c (1958); RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF ToRTs § 299, comment f (1965).
82. 202 App. Div. 477, 195 N.Y.S. 810 (1922).
83. 44 N.J.L. 286 (Sup. Ct. 1882).
84. Id. at 290.
85. Degen v. Steinbeck, 202 App. Div. 477, 479, 195 N.Y.S. 810, 814 (1922).
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One usual result of the recognition of specialization in a profession
is some alteration in the standard of care applicable to general practi-
tioners. In medical malpractice, a number of cases have held a general
practitioner liable when he failed to refer patients to medical specialists
after the need for specialized treatment became apparent."8 However, no
court has yet found an attorney liable for malpractice because he failed to
refer a client to a legal specialist. In Lucas v. Hamm, however, a lower
California court noted that :"'
[t]he law today has its specialities, and even as the general
practitioner in medicine must seek the aid of the specialist in
his profession, so the general practitioner in law, when faced
with a problem beyond his capabilities, must turn to the expert
in his profession to the end that his client is properly served.
On appeal, the lower court was reversed without mention of the con-
sultation issue." With the recognition of legal specialization, however,
recognition of a duty to consult a legal specialist in appropriate situations
seems clearly to follow from analogous principles of medical malpractice.
CON-CLUSION
The theory behind the imposition of liability for legal malpractice is
that a client has been injured by his attorney's deviation from customary
practices of the profession. The currently articulated standard of care for
legal malpractice is not adequate to implement this theory. Primarily, this
is due to the failure to particularize the general statement of that standard,
legal custom, in such a way that jurors can effectively use it to gauge the
defendant's conduct in a concrete fact situation. Effective particulariza-
tion of the standard of care can only occur through the use of testimony
of other attorneys to inform the jurors of the customary practices of the
profession in the situation confronting the defendant. Moreover, the
original burden of presenting such testimony should fall upon the plaintiff.
Effective particularization also requires that the locality of the defendant's
practice be taken into account. Jurors must be made aware of significant
differences in the opportunities for experience and resources among
attorneys practicing in widely variant communities. More importantly,
jurors must be aware of the propriety of an attorney's conduct turning
upon his awareness of peculiarities and characteristics of the community
in which he practices. Finally, effective particularization requires a candid
86. Seneris v. Haas, 45 Cal. 2d 811, 291 P.2d 915 (1955) ; Denison v. Dean, 232
N.Y. 52, 133 N.E. 125 (1921) ; McCoid, supra note 13 at 597.
87. Lucas v. Hamm, 11 Cal. Rptr. 727, 173 (Dist. Ct. App. 1961).
88. Lucas v. Hamm, 56 Cal. 2d 583, 364 P.2d 685, 15 Cal. Rptr. 821, cert. dened,
368 U.S. 987 (1962).
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recognition of the existence of legal specialization and of the concomitant
fact that not all attorneys are equally qualified to handle all legal problems.
The jurors should be made aware of the specialized character of an
attorney's practice and of the effect of that specialization on the customary
quality of performance.
The medical-legal malpractice analogy will undoubtedly remain a
significant force in the development of legal malpractice concepts. The
utility and correctness of that analogy on many points cannot be doubted.
However, an uncritical use of the analogy to expand the concepts of legal
malpractice tends to overlook significant differences between the two
professions. Medicine tends to be a scientific and objective profession.
Law, however, is a practical art. In order to serve his client properly,
an attorney must consider the financial situation of his client, the
peculiarities and prejudices of judges, jurors, and the public, as well as
the political, social, and racial characteristics of the community. Proper
medical treatment does not vary with these factors. Any development of
legal malpractice rules must take cognizance of the realities of legal
practices, as well as the inter-relations of the professions.
Martin T. Fletcher
